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Abstract 
 
The article deals with the economic behaviour of a hypothetical politi-
cal leader in the institutionally underdeveloped democratic environ-
ment of a transitional society. By using Stigler-Peltzman’s model of 
economic regulation, it has been shown that there is no optimal solu-
tion for an autocratic leader. In the long run, wealth transfer to politi-
cal supporters alone is not sufficient for the autocrat to stay in power. 
That’s why such regimes are generally unstable, and will ultimately be 
either overthrown or transformed into ‘hard’ dictatorships. The mar-
ginal costs of regime protection and opposition, crucial for the politi-
cal behaviour of conflicted social groups, can be considered as politi-
cal turning points responsible for sudden and unexpected social changes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Democracy can be delineated by three essential features: 1 regular 
free and fair elections on the basis of universal suffrage; 2. respon-
sibility of the state apparatus to the elected representatives and 3. 
guarantees of freedom of expression and association (Huber, et al. 
1993). On the other side, a dictatorship can briefly be outlined as 
the use of repression to stay in power (Wintrobe 1998). According 
to a broader definition by Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965), a totali-
tarian dictatorship can be described by six characteristics: 1 domi-
nance of an official ideology; 2 a single party led by an individual; 
3 terrorist use of the police force; 4 monopoly of mass communica-
tion and media; 5 monopoly of armaments, and 6 state control of 
the economy. In all of the transitional countries in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia that was the case during the age of communism, 
which gives us a rationale to use Freidrich-Brzezinski’s definition 
in this context. 
 
During the nineties, after, in some cases dramatic political changes, 
in most of the mentioned countries, a new wave of democratisation 
has been initiated. In the contrast to the high expectations, the po-
litical and economic reality was much harder. Underdeveloped in-
stitutions, lack of human capital, and still-strong resistance of the 
previous system created a state of uncertainty in most of the transi-
tional countries. Only the countries that had inherited substantial 
levels of human resources with firm memories of democracy and a 
market economy have succeeded in creating adequate institutions 
(Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary). It is 
not surprising that transition in the mentioned countries can be con-
sidered as a great success. 
  
In other emerging democracies, transition was a less successful 
story. Owing not only to the economic problems, and the so-called 
transitional instability (Rostowski 1998), in most of the slow-reform 
countries many problems and uncertainties in the democratic proc-
esses are evident. Numerous examples can be found in Serbia, Bela-
rus, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan 
etc. In order to give a precise image of the underdeveloped democ-
racy we shall compare the existent conditions with the Freidrich-
Brzezinski definition.  38  European Political Economy Review  
 
 
In all of these transitional societies there is no longer any official 
ideological background for the classical dictatorship. The Marxist-
Leninist ideology has been abandoned. It is surprising that liberal-
democratic, even libertarian, ideas are very popular in academic and 
professional circles, even in very underdeveloped democracies. 
However, the broad population is frequently overwhelmed with a 
mixture of nationalism and populist ideas.  
 
In all of the analysed countries there is no longer a single party mo-
nopoly. However, the political life is far from being competitive. In 
many of the transitional countries dominance of the leading party or 
a group of parties can be seen. All of such quasi-monopolistic par-
ties are linked to an autocratic individual, and very much inclined to 
the use of repressive means in order to stay in power. Most of such 
autocrats accept, at least, a formal democracy (accepting  political 
elections at regular time intervals, plus accepting foreign observers 
in order to create an illusion of fairness and freedom, even accept-
ing a theoretical possibility to loose the elections)
1. However, they 
still maintain more or less a monopoly of the media and mass com-
munication, and an absolute monopoly of armaments. They fre-
quently support the illegal use of the police force, and most off all, 
they strongly support political control over the economy.  
 
In order to stay in power new leaders primarily, but not exclusively, 
use the instruments of economic regulation and redistribution. Other 
means of keeping the political status quo, so common to the classi-
cal dictators, have a limited significance, owing to the domestic po-
litical opposition and international pressures. The new breed of po-
litical leaders in the post-communist societies can be called “soft 
autocrats”, in contrast to the “hard” or classical dictators from the 
communist era. 
 
                                                 
1  In dealing with the sensitive issue of what policies should be followed toward 
dictatorship by democratic regimes Ronald Wintrobe (1998) concluded that 
human rights observance should be the cornerstone of Western policy. Just in 
order to satisfy at least some basic human right standards, post-communist 
autocrats  have a tendency to accept the necessity of political elections.  Author: Pešić/Boričić: Political Economy of Post-Communist Autocracy 39 
In the modern political economy a considerable analysis is devoted 
to alternative forms of democracy and dictatorship. The continuum 
that lies between these two pure forms of government has recently 
been analysed in the form of “King and Council Template” (Con-
gleton 2001). By providing an efficient explanation for the bipolar 
model of government, Congleton (2001) suggested that a division of 
policy-making responsibilities between a single executive (king, 
president, prime minister) and a council (congress, parliament, as-
sembly, committee) offers a durable and universally-applicable po-
litical solution.  
 
In most of the slow-moving transitional countries, political power 
lies much more in the hands of a single executive than in the hands 
of, in most cases, a newborn and still weak council. In all societies 
where the single-executive (or “a king”) pattern has a historical su-
premacy over the “council” pattern, especially where the tradition 
of parliamentarianism has been weak, a certain time is needed to es-
tablish and develop democratic institutions. In such societies, even 
the possibility of fair political elections will not guarantee that the 
state apparatus will be responsible to the elected representatives, 
which is the essential feature of political democracy. On the con-
trary, the state apparatus will be responsible primarily to the auto-
cratic leader who regulates and controls, punishes or rewards. In or-
der to analyse the political reality of post-communist societies that 
are less rapid in reforms, or less successful in transition, we are go-
ing to apply the “soft autocracy” template.     
                   
 
2.   The Model 
 
George Stigler’s work on the theory of economic regulation (Stigler 
1971) inspired Sam Peltzman to create an optimal regulation model 
(Peltzman 1976). Formalising the previous recognition, Peltzman 
created a more general model, which applies to any situation of po-
litical wealth redistribution. In our attempt to analyse the economic 
behaviour of an autocrat, some of the Peltzman basic assumptions 
and relations have been used. In our model, a post-communist po-
litical leader, no matter how he originally came to power, is con-
fronted with elections at regular time intervals. Assuming that some 
political elections do exist, without consideration of how fair they 40  European Political Economy Review  
 
really are, we have introduced the possibility that the autocrat may 
be overthrown. In our model the autocrat is not in a position to rule 
endlessly, but as long as he rules, his power is unlimited. There are 
no possibilities of any political interference by the parliament, or by 
any other political structure. It is the case of an unlimited regulation 
power that may be challenged from time to time by the election 
process.  
 
Ignoring the possibility of political support due to irrational and 
emotional reactions (like in situations of external threats to the 
country), we are strictly oriented to economic terms. We assume 
that the rational political leader is in the position to maximise his 
political support, by transferring wealth to a group of his followers 
– which in the broadest sense could include the public in general, 
although this is less common
2.  
 
Our analysis is based on the assumption that in most cases political 
leaders transfer wealth primarily to a more narrow group of sup-
porters. Wealth transfer is an instrumental variable to the autocrat. 
The amount of wealth transferred to the beneficiary group can ap-
pear in many different forms: ownership or tenure of the valuable 
natural resources, possession of specific administrative allowances, 
like export or import permits, unlimited access to hard currency, or 
favourable credit arrangements, etc. All of these options are aimed 
at giving a monopolistic or privileged position to the nomenclature 
members, in order to make them support the leader. On the other 
hand, the political leader expects that a certain portion of the wealth 
transfer will end in his account, by “voluntary” donations of the 
nomenclature members to his political campaign.
3  
                                                 
2  Transferring wealth to the entire population can be very expensive. The only 
way for the political leader to obtain wealth for such a wide public support is 
from foreign sources. A rare historical case of such political practice was found 
in President Tito’s Yugoslavia from the 1950’s to 1980, where the amount of 
generous help to Yugoslavia was very high and persistent (Prickett et al. 1990). 
However, there was another specificity of the former Yugoslav case. Although 
J. B. Tito had started his political career as a totalitarian dictator, he turned out 
to be the best example of  a dictator-timocrat in  Wintrobe’s  sense (Wintrobe 
1998).  
 
3  Actually, the autocrat is also interested to maximise this flow, called  “a racket”. 
Sometimes, when the chances for political changes via elections are weak he is Author: Pešić/Boričić: Political Economy of Post-Communist Autocracy 41 
 
If we assume that the probability of obtaining international financial 
support for such a regime is quite low
4, it becomes logical to con-
clude that the above-mentioned wealth transfer can be made by im-
pairing the rest of the population. In such a case, the injured parties 
will create a political opposition and will vote against the autocratic 
leader.  
 
To put this formally, we will use Peltzman’s equation describing the 
goal function of the regulator. In Peltzman’s model, the regulator 
wants to maximize a majority of votes M, generated as a difference 
between political support and political opposition: 
 
                           M =  n·f  -  (N-n)·h                                            (1) 
 
where 
n - number of potential voters in the beneficiary group 
f - (net) probability that a beneficiary will grant support 
N - total number of potential voters 
  h - (net) probability that a voter excluded from the benefici-
ary group opposes. 
In our model the autocrat is also maximizing M, in order not to stay 
in power
5. Both gainers (nomenclature members) and losers (the 
rest of the population) face transaction and information costs, so f 
and h are between 0 and 1, but never either 0 or 1: 
                                                                                                               
more interested in the amount of the “racket” than in political support. In an-
other words he may become a kind of a tinpot-dictator (Wintrobe 1998). 
 
4  Post-communist autocracies are not only unpopular  in the democratic world, 
but  some of them have also been exposed to serious international economic 
sanctions. It may be justifiable to introduce the assumption of  a relatively 
closed economy into the analysis. 
5  To win the elections, M should be positive. Winning the elections with a low 
margin, (positive but small M) may be theoretically sufficient for the leader to 
stay in office. However, to remain being an autocrat, a high M is needed. The 
higher M is, the more certain is the political victory of the autocrat, and the in-
fluence of the Parliament (including political opposition) is lower. 
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                 0 < f < 1      and     0 < h <1                                        (2) 
              
The probability of support (the probability of voting for) depends 
on the per capita benefit (gain) obtained from the wealth transfer, 
diminished by per capita amount of the “voluntary” wealth re-
transfer, or the “racket”, to the autocrat or his party, plus per capita 
costs of the regime protection. 
 
The probability of support may be specified as  f = f (g) , where g is 
per capita net benefit, or gain, received by a member of the support-
ing group 
 
                              g = 
n
n C K T ) ( − −
                                          (3) 
with  
  T - total pecuniary amount of wealth transfer to the beneficiary 
group 
  K - total amount of the “voluntary” donations to the leader or 
the “racket 
        C(n) - amount of the regime protection costs (police, security 
forces, judiciary institutions). 
 
The probability of opposing the autocrat (or the probability of vot-
ing against) depends on per capita damage, h=h(d). The per capita 
damage d, to a member of the non-beneficiary group, is equal to the 
wealth transfer T, plus per capita cost of opposition.
6   
    
                      
n N
n N Z T
d
−
− +
=
) (
                                                 (4) 
                                                 
6  In our analysis we have neglected the allocative effects of  wealth transfer, 
from one group to another, assuming that the total amount of gain equals the to-
tal amount of loss, T. This simplification is based on the assumption that both  
social groups would use the transferred wealth with an equal efficiency. 
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with  
              Z(N-n) - total amount of the opposition costs (income sac-
rificed because of striking, costs of job loss, costs of politi-
cal organising, all other pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs 
of resistance).  
The probability of support f is determined by the net per capita 
benefit g ; the greater the net benefit is, the higher the support will 
be. Symmetrically, the probability of opposing the autocrat h, de-
pends on the per capita damage, d. The greater the per capita dam-
age is, the higher the probability that opposition will occur. This 
means that: 
 
 fg≥0  and hd≥0 
7                                                              (5) 
 
In keeping with the Stigler-Peltzman model, we also assumed that 
fgg<0 , hdd< 0, which means that benefits and losses are subject to 
diminishing returns. These relationships imply that the continued 
use of wealth transfer for maintaining the political power, will pro-
duce diminishing effects
8.  
At the same time, cost functions C(n) and Z(N-n) decrease in re-
spect of n and (N-n), which means that the more supporters of the 
political idea exist, the easier, or cheaper, is to promote it. 
   
Cn<0  and  Z(N-n)<0 
9                                                        (6) 
                                                 
7  Unless specified otherwise, subscripts will denote partial, or where appropriate, 
total derivatives: 
     =
∂
∂
g
f
fg           
d
h
∂
∂
=hd          
2
2
g
f
∂
∂
=fgg          and         
2
2
d
h
∂
∂
=hdd . 
8  A similar assumption can be found in the Wintorobe’s model of a tinpot regime 
(Wintrobe 1998:46) 
9  The more supporters the autocrat has, the total regime protection costs C(n) are 
more lowered. . However, C(n) could never reach minimum, becoming zero, 
because it is highly improbable or impossible that all members of the society 
are supporting the autocrat. Consequently,     
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In an attempt to optimise the political position, the autocratic leader 
will try to maximize M , using the amount of wealth transfer T, the 
amount of re-transfer K, and the size of beneficiary group n , as in-
strumental variables. Mathematically we are looking for 
 
 max  M = n· ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − −
n
n C K T
f
) (
  -  (N-n)· ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡
−
− +
n N
n N Z T
h
) (
        (7)                                             
 
The partial derivatives of M, with respect to T,  K  and n,  and the 
corresponding first-order conditions are: 
 
          MT = 
T
M
∂
∂
 = nfg – (N-n)hd = 0                                            (8) 
 
          MK =
K
M
∂
∂
 = -nfg = 0                                                          (9) 
 
          Mn = 
n
M
∂
∂
 = f (g) + h(d) – fg (Cn+g) + hd (ZN-n –d) = 0   (10) 
                                                                                                               
         Cn=
n
n C
∂
∂ ) (
 <0 . 
 
   A complementary assumption can be made for the opposition costs; the more 
of the population excluded from the beneficiary group, the lower the costs of 
political resistance are. However, owing to the fact that it is  impossible for all 
members of the society to oppose the autocrat, the opposition costs could never 
reach minimum, becoming zero. Consequently,  
            
          Z(N-n)=
) (
) (
n N
n N Z
− ∂
− ∂
 <0 . 
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Combining equations (8) , (9) and (10), for n≠0  and  N≠n , yields 
the following solutions: 
 
           fg = hd   = 0                                                                         (11) 
 f(g) = - h(d)                                                                 (12) 
 
From the autocrat’s standpoint, it can be concluded that the optimal 
level of wealth transfer is one that equates marginal probability of 
support (voting for) with marginal probability of opposition (voting 
against).
10 At the same time, optimal level is the level that equates 
both of the marginal probabilities with zero.
11 However, the solu-
tion obtained from equation (10), also seen in (12), is in contradic-
tion with the condition in equation (2). Having in mind that both of 
the probabilities can only be positive, we conclude that there is no 
solution for equation (12). This means that under the previous as-
sumptions, there is no possibility for the autocrat to maximise a po-
litical majority.  
 
Maximisation of the “voluntary” wealth re-transfer or maximisation 
of the “racket” may be another political goal of an autocratic leader. 
If he assumes that the political potential for change is low, and that 
there is no chance for the opposition to win the elections, his pri-
mary interest will be focused on K. Using the inverse function dif-
ferentiation rule we have:  
 
KM=
M
K
∂
∂
= 
g nf
1
−                                                     (13) 
 
                                                 
10  From equation (8) 
11  From equation (9) 
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However, owing to the fact that -1/nfg can never be zero, and KM≠0, 
we conclude that there is also no chance for the autocrat to maxi-
mize the “racket”. 
The impossibility of optimising either M or K, as a goal function, 
reveals the political instability of the autocrat’s position if he relies 
only on wealth transfer to his supporters. This gives him a choice 
either to use other means of keeping power, typical for totalitarian 
dictators, or, sooner or later, to lose the elections. 
Let us turn our attention to other members of the society. A poten-
tial voter for, or a member of the beneficiary group, will try to 
maximise his per capita net benefit, or g: 
 
  max   g = 
n
n C K T ) ( − −
                                              (14) 
 
The corresponding first-order condition is as follows: 
 
gn = 
n
g
∂
∂
 =  [] n C
n
n C K T
n
1
) (
1
2 − − − −   0 ) (
1
= + − = g C
n
n    
i.e.        n opt C g − =                                                          (15) 
 
Because of (6), it is clear that g>0, meaning that the optimum for a 
beneficiary group member is equal to the negative value of the mar-
ginal regime protection costs. 
On the other side, a member of the opposition group will try to 
minimize his per capita damage: 
 
min  
n N
n N Z T
d
−
− +
=
) (
                                               (16)  
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() ()
()
n N
Z
Z T
n N n N
d
d
n N
n N n N −
+ +
−
−
=
− ∂
∂
=
−
− − 2
1
= 
0 ) (
1
= −
−
= − d Z
n N
n N       
 we obtain:  dopt = ZN-n                              (17) 
 
From (17) it becomes obvious that the optimum for an opposition 
member (the minimal per capita damage) is equal to the marginal 
opposition cost.  
 
 
3.   Conclusion 
 
In order to explore the political reality of post-communist societies, 
a model of “soft autocracy” has been developed. The model is based 
on experiences from a number of East European and Central Asian 
countries characterised by the slow pace of transition, underdevel-
oped institutions, and the lack of democratic traditions. A very sig-
nificant role for an individual political leader and a quite minor role 
for collective governance institutions is a common feature of such 
countries. In the contrast to the totalitarian dictators, from the age of 
communism (Stalin, or Chausescu), new autocratic post-communist 
leaders (Milosevic, Sevarnadze, Lukasenko) are more oriented to-
ward  economic regulation. Although much of the classical totalitar-
ian instruments of power keeping can be found in their arsenal, the 
new autocrats are primarily oriented on wealth redistribution in fa-
vour of  political supporters, in exchange for their loyalty. From the 
model we have developed, two conclusions can be made. 
 
First: In a hypothetical post-communist society, there is no optimal 
solution for the autocratic leader. Relying solely on wealth transfer 
to the supporters does not guarantee staying in office in perpetuity. 
A possible way of staying in power is either to revoke the elections, 
or to counterfeit the election results. This means that the previously 
developed model of so-called “soft autocracy” will ultimately be 
transformed into a “hard dictatorship”, with no elections, and no le-
gally-permitted opposition. However, in the contemporary world, 
such a course of events is not probable, and the durability of such a 48  European Political Economy Review  
 
regime would be highly questionable. The end of autocracy seems 
to be a more probable outcome.   
 
In the model, there is also no optimal solution for the “racket” 
maximization. This means that if the autocrat decides to act as a 
tinpot, in order to satisfy his personal and political demand for 
wealth, he will ultimately be transformed into a plunderer, robbing, 
in the terminal phase of his government, not only members of the 
opposition, but members of the beneficiary, or nomenclature, group 
too
12. This will trigger a shift in their political preferences and can 
be considered as “sparks that will lead to prairie fires” in Timur 
Kuran’s (1989, 1991) sense. 
 
Second: In economic terms, the marginal costs of regime protection 
and marginal costs of opposition determine both of the social 
groups’ optima. This reveals the significance of the costs imposed 
either on the beneficiary group (regime protection costs), or on the 
opposition group (costs of resistance). When beneficiary group 
members conceive the regime protection costs to be too high, they 
will change their political preferences and their alienation from the 
dictator will be increased
13. However, when opposition group mem-
bers conceive resistance as too expensive, their political behaviour 
may become less radical. Those moments can also be considered as 
political turning points in Kuran’s (1995) sense. Such turning points, 
caused by the individual perception of marginal political costs, may 
be crucial for understanding the sudden changes in political behav-
iour. 
   
 
                                                 
12   This is in accordance with Mancur  Olson’s (1991: 153) statement that an in-
secure  autocrat is likely to plunder  the society. 
13   This may be an example of an “unpleasant  experience with the government” 
which can cause “a slight shift in one individual’s threshold” (Kuran, 1991: 
122). Such preference shifts are vividly described in Tim Marshall’s chronicle 
of political changes in Serbia (2002). 
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